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1. Introduction
Donald Gillies is one of the pioneers in the philosophical analysis of artificial
intelligence (AI).  In his recent book, Gillies (1996) not only makes a new and rapidly
developing field of science accessible to philosophers; he also introduces
philosophical topics relevant to researchers in AI and thereby helps establish a
dialogue between the two disciplines.  His book clearly and convincingly
demonstrates the fruitful interplay between AI and philosophy of science.
The present paper continues the discussion in the book by focusing on
methodological issues.  I agree with a lot of what Gillies has to say, but
commentaries tend to be more interesting if the commentator focuses on
controversial issues.  So I will discuss three topics on which our views differ.  First I
reconsider the issue of the relevance of scientific developments for a philosophical
debate (Sec. 2).  More specifically, I will address the following question: Do we have
to change our philosophical views in the light of the development of new scientific
tools (such as Bayesian Networks)?  Contrary to Gillies, I will argue that the new
developments in AI have no impact on what Gillies calls the Bayesian controversy.
Second I discuss two of Gillies’ concrete methodological recommendations.  Gillies
suggests that the use of objective probabilities and the construction of a Bayesian
Network model should be supplemented by a Popperian testing methodology.  I will
argue that the process of finding the value of an objective probability is not an
instance of a test (Sec. 3), and that there are alternative (and perhaps more efficient)
strategies for the construction of a Bayesian Network model (Sec. 4).  Third I am
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2concerned with the scope of Bayesianism.  Gillies gives an argument to the effect
that Bayesianism does not apply to general hypotheses.  I will show that this
argument does not go through (Sec. 5).
2. The Philosophical Implications of AI
There is no doubt that science has an effect on our philosophical views.  Some
scientific developments have inspired work in metaphysics (e.g. quantum statistics
gave rise to a reconsideration of the concept of individuality), and other
developments forced philosophers to rethink their positions (e.g. about absolute
space).  The situation in AI, however, is different.  Here, a new scientific tool is
developed (i.e. Bayesian Networks) and Gillies claims that this development has
methodological implications for the Bayesian controversy.  This controversy is
concerned with two issues.  The first is about the use of probabilities (as opposed to
other ways of representing uncertainty in AI).  The second is the interpretation of
probability.  Let me examine both issues in turn.
A survey of the literature reveals that the majority of approaches to AI use
probabilities, while only a minority deals with alternatives such as the Dempster-
Shafer theory, ranking functions, or Popper functions.  This raises the question of
whether the calculus of probabilities is appropriate to handling uncertainty.
Probabilities are very popular in scientific practice.  But can we conclude from this
that probabilities are better than alternative options; i.e. can we conclude from this
that the right way to represent uncertainty is by using probabilities?  I do not think so.
The popularity of Bayesian Networks in the AI community can be understood by
noticing two points: First, there is an extremely fruitful research program centered
around Bayesian Networks which gives researchers in the field a chance to make
their own contributions to the development of the theory.  Second, Bayesian
Networks are very easy to apply.  In fact, they are much easier to apply than any of
the other available tools, which is partially rooted in the fact that the alternatives to
Bayesian Networks are simply not developed well enough yet.  These pragmatic
factors play an important role when a decision has to be made as to which tool we
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philosophical claim.
When discussing non-Bayesian approaches of handling uncertainty, Gillies himself
does not refer to alternatives such as the Dempster-Shafer theory, but to measures
of confirmation C(H, E) for a hypothesis H by evidence E that do not satisfy the
standard axioms of probability.  In symbols the claim is that C(H, E) ≠ P(H I E).  This
is confusing because different measures of confirmation (Fitelson 1999) have been
discussed extensively within the Bayesian literature.  These measures (such as the
difference measure, the ratio measure, and the log-likelihood measure) do not satisfy
the axioms of probability theory.  Gillies also mentions the certainty factors used in
the expert system MYCIN, which do not obey the axioms of probability theory.  It
should be noted, however, that Heckerman (1986) shows that a consistent
probabilistic interpretation of certainty factors can be given.  According to this
analysis, certainty factors are monotonic transformations of the likelihood ratio P(H I
E)/P(H I ¬E).  This demonstrates that there are many different ways of handling
uncertainty also within the Bayesian paradigm.
The second aspect of the Bayesian controversy is the interpretation of probability.
Gillies suggests that the development of Bayesian networks supports a subjective
interpretation because they were developed within the tradition of subjective
Bayesianism.  I do not think that this argument holds.  To see why, consider the
following analogy.  Quantum mechanics in its current form was developed within the
tradition of the Copenhagen approach of quantum mechanics.  Bohr, for example,
entertained the ideas that later became part of the Copenhagen interpretation long
before the development of the formal theory in the 1920s.  And yet, no one would
claim that the success of quantum mechanics provides an argument for this
interpretation.  Later, other interpretations (like the many-worlds or the many-minds
interpretation) were developed which turned out to be completely compatible with
quantum mechanics.  And indeed, Gillies himself points out that Bayesian Networks
can also be applied if the probabilities in question are objective.  Hence, even if
Bayesian Networks were created within the tradition of subjective Bayesianism, the
theory of Bayesian Networks itself is neutral with respect to the interpretation of
probability (Bovens and Hartmann 2002, Williamson 2001).  In the first place,
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probabilistic structures, irrespective of how the probabilities are interpreted.  One
might reply that Bayesian Networks require the specification of some prior
probabilities which is, after all, a typical Bayesian step.  This, however, is not correct
since Gillies’ own examples from medicine show that prior probabilities can also be
objective.
Let us now examine if the subjective interpretation of probability was heuristically
important for the development of Bayesian Networks.  In his personal account, Pearl
(1993) mentions a lot of factors that played a role there, but he does not mention
subjective probabilities.  Apart from paying lip service to subjective Bayesianism, no
deeper influence of this methodological account is acknowledged.  Apparently the
Bayesian framework is flexible enough to allow for an incorporation of the technical
ideas and practical applications that guided Pearl’s thinking.  In any case,
philosophical questions concerning the interpretation of the probability calculus do
not seem to have been that important after all.
To sum up, I do not see that the development of Bayesian Networks has an effect on
the Bayesian controversy in philosophy of science.  The question whether
Bayesianism is a good methodology or not is of course important.  It is, however, not
decided or even illuminated by pointing to a commonly used tool in AI.
3. Objective Probabilities
Gillies makes several methodological recommendations in his paper.  He argues, for
instance, that objective probabilities should be used whenever possible and that the
use of objective probabilities requires a Popperian methodology.  Let us examine
these two claims.  To support the first claim, Gillies discusses an example from
medical diagnostics.  It turns out that expert systems based on objective probabilities
yield better results than systems that use averaged subjective probabilities provided
by experts.  I agree, but I do not find this particularly astonishing.  After all, the
subjective probabilities provided by the experts are nothing but guesses of the values
of objective probabilities.  These guesses are based on the experience of the expert,
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textbooks and journal articles.  That is, the subjective probabilities discussed here are
hypotheses about the values of objective probabilities.  An expert estimates these
probabilities and this, of course, may involve errors and inaccuracies.  The error will
be expected to be particularly high if the sample an expert uses for his judgements is
small.  And this is just what Gillies’ examples show.
Let us now turn to Gillies’ second claim.  Do objective probabilities require a
Popperian testing methodology?  Gillies argues that the assignment of an objective
probability is a conjecture, and conjectures have to be tested.  If the hypothesis does
not pass the test, it is falsified and a new conjecture has to be made.  I doubt that this
reconstruction of scientific practice is adequate.  True, to claim that an objective
probability has a certain value is a scientific hypothesis.  This claim is based on the
available data.  If new data become available, the corresponding value is updated
(and not revised), i.e. it is changed according to all available evidence.  This is done
on the basis of the new and old data jointly.  Such an updating procedure does not
correspond to a test of the original hypothesis, which was, perhaps, falsified.  The
original hypothesis was simply modified on the basis of more data.
It is worth pointing out that such a procedure is not a problem for a Bayesian.  The
modification of the value we claim an objective probability to have is a different
procedure than the updating of the probability of a hypothesis in the light of new
evidence.  It can be done “by hand” without using Bayes’ theorem (Hawthorne 1993,
p. 134).
4. A Testing Methodology for Bayesian Networks?
According to Gillies, a testing methodology is not only needed for the specification of
various objective probabilities, but also for the determination of the structure of a
Bayesian Network.  In his example from medicine, one starts with causal knowledge
from experts.  On the basis of this knowledge, a Bayesian Network model is
constructed.  Now, this network implies various probabilistic independencies which
may turn out not to be reflected in the statistical data the network is supposed to
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statistical data is falsified and a new hypothesis has to be found.  Hence, Gillies
suggests the following methodology to construct a Bayesian Network model: (1) Start
with the causal knowledge of experts and construct a Bayesian Network.  (2) Use all
available data to test the independence assumptions (and perhaps also other
assumptions) made by the network model.  These tests are attractive because they
provide an answer to a yes/no question: an independence condition either holds or it
does not.  (It is assumed that the values of the objective probabilities were already
tested.)  (3) If the model does not pass a test, a modified network has to be
suggested based on new knowledge about various independencies.
In which situations is this procedure a good methodology?  Certainly if there is
reliable causal knowledge and if the number of variables is small.  Both conditions
hold in Gillies’ example from medicine.  Moreover, they are often related for it is
harder to formulate reliable causal claims if the number of variables is large.
However, if the number of variables is large, there may not be enough computational
power available to test all independencies represented by the network.
What alternatives are there to Gillies’ Popperian methodology?  I will discuss three.
First, if there is no causal knowledge to start with, a methodology based on Bayesian
Networks can be used to discover causal knowledge.  Algorithms such as the ones
developed by the CMU group aim at finding a Bayesian Network which fits a certain
set of statistical data best (Spirtes et al. 2000).  An additional Popperian testing
methodology is not needed here.  It should be mentioned however, that this
methodology has a lot of problems of its own and so far not much causal knowledge
has been gained.
A second alternative is to apply a Bayesian methodology.  Here, tests are also
possible.  If the data is inconsistent with the independence assumptions represented
by the network, the probability of the data given the network, P(data I graph), equals
zero and hence, by Bayes’ Theorem, we have P(graph I data) = 0.  This in turn leads
to a falsification of the proposed network model (Howson and Urbach 1996, p. 84f).
A problem with this procedure is that it does not directly identify the faulty
7independence assumption.  However, given additional background knowledge, a
negative test may suggest a better model.
A third strategy, which is also a Bayesian strategy, is to start with several possible
candidate models and then eliminate them successively when new data become
available.  Hawthorne (1993) defended this methodology and proved a number of
limiting theorems that aim at demonstrating the practicability of this procedure.  This
strategy does, however, not seem to be realistic given certain computational
limitations.
To sum up, there seems to be a plurality of strategies which guide the construction of
a Bayesian Network.  Gillies’ Popperian testing methodology is one of them.  All of
these strategies have problems.  It will be interesting to learn more about the
conditions under which the various methodological strategies can be successfully
applied.
5. The Scope of Bayesianism
Gillies mentions in this paper, and argues in more detail elsewhere, that he accepts
Bayesianism only if it is about specific hypotheses.  He presents a new argument for
the conclusion that general hypotheses have probability zero (Gillies 1998, p. 154f).
This implies, by Bayes Theorem, that also the posterior probabilities of general
hypotheses are zero which, in turn, renders the whole Bayesian program useless in
these cases.  I will argue that Gillies’ argument is flawed.
The argument is based on the observation that one cannot win a bet on a general
hypothesis.  One can only lose it.  Hence one should not bet on a general
hypothesis, which implies that its probability is zero.  Let us look at a specific case.
Let H be the hypothesis “All ravens are black”.  Since H is a general hypothesis, P(H)
= 0 and so P(not-H) = 1.  Hence we should be prepared to bet everything on the
hypothesis that there is a non-black raven.  I am not prepared to do so, and I am not
sure if Gillies is.  I think that my argument shows that something is wrong with Gillies’
de Finetti style argument.  I take it to be much more plausible to follow the
8programme outlined by Ramsey and to assign probabilities on the basis of utilities.
This might indeed lead to a non-zero probability for a general hypothesis.
Having defended Bayesianism against the charges of Gillies, I should mention a
problem which Bayesians and Popperians share.  Both methodologies assume that a
decision can always be made.  For a Popperian, a hypothesis either passes a test or
is falsified; for a Bayesian it can always be decided which hypothesis of a set of
hypotheses should be accepted.  This might not always be possible.  One can
imagine situations in which there is not enough evidence to make a decision because
there is too much uncertainty.  Instead of making a definite decision, scientists should
withhold judgement and try to collect more relevant information.  That is, I suggest to
weaken the link between Bayesianism and decision theory.2
To sum up, I have argued in this paper that the remarkable developments in AI have
no baring on the Bayesian controversy.  New scientific tools such as Bayesian
Networks do not provide arguments in favor of a specific interpretation of probability
or a specific scientific methodology.  It is up to philosophical analysis to provide
arguments in favor or against one of the various options.
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